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i The OTPP is well known for having a governance structure that is modeled after the CPPIB's. 
ii For example, see Chapter 19 of Ambachtsheer (2007b) and Chapter 10 of Ambachtsheer (2016). 
iii The Guidelines were revised twice since their issuance, first in April 2005 and again in June 2009. 
iv Founded in 1995, the ICGN is an international nonprofit organization whose members manage over 
US$9 trillion of assets. 
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v For  example, see Clark and Monk (2011), in which the authors analyzed the current state of PRFs' 
design, governance and management based on case studies of four PRFs: the CPPIB, Australian Future 
Fund, Irish National Pension Reserve Fund and New Zealand Superannuation Fund. 
vi Under Japan's Companies Act, the monitoring board model corresponds to a governance structure 
where a company's board of directors delegates authority to committees (e.g., nominating committee) 
subordinate to itself. 
vii For example, the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) invested in a company 
affiliated with one of its board members in 2010. The board member was subsequently sued on conflict-
of-interest grounds and lost the lawsuit. 
viii The prudent person rule is a standard of conduct imposed on fiduciaries by the US Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). A prudent person is defined as a diligent, sensible person with 
sufficient expertise. The rule is based on the idea that a fiduciary's judgment and actions should meet a 
standard of prudence that would be expected of professionals in their field. 
ix In addition to holding face-to-face meetings, the CPPIB's chairperson and CEO participate in online 
question-and-answer sessions also. 
x The 37 funds are located in seven countries: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Sweden and the US, 
Netherlands and UK. They manage US$2.2 trillion collectively and, on average, about US$59.5 billion 
apiece. 
xi More precisely, they are weighted by risk contribution. 
xii The expert panel was convened by the economic revitalization minister to provide recommendations on 
public and quasi-public funds' investment practices (e.g., diversification), governance (e.g., risk 
management) and measures to improve returns from long-term equity investments, taking into 
consideration each fund's size and attributes. The panel was convened pursuant to the Japan 
Revitalization Strategy (approved by the Cabinet on June 14, 2013), formulated as a growth strategy 
designed to spur private investment. This growth strategy is Abenomics' third plank ("third arrow").  
xiii Both basic pension and employee pension (kosei nenkin) benefits. 
xiv The process by which the target rate of return was set is beyond this report's scope. 
xv I headed the Investment Advisory Committee working group that formulated the new policy asset mix. 
The working group's proposed asset mix was ultimately approved by the Investment Advisory Committee 
and publicly announced as the GPIF's new asset mix in October 2014. 
xvi For example, see Kocken (2011). 
xvii The MHLW was responsible for calculation of conditional expected shortfalls. 
xviii There are a number of possible reasons that the selected managers did not include any with Japan-
based portfolio management operations. One reason is that global comparative analysis now plays an 
important role in selection of longer-term equity holdings. Another reason is that having an on-the-ground 
presence in Japan is no longer necessarily an advantage in terms of stock selection. Nearly all of the 
asset managers recently hired by the GPIF invest in not only Japanese but also global equities. Their 
global equity investment teams have been investing in rigorously screened Japanese companies capable 
of successfully competing with global rivals. They make investment decisions based on analysis of the 
international competitive landscape transcending their respective home countries. They also regularly 
compare notes with colleagues that invest exclusively in Japanese equities, improving each other's ability 
to identify companies capable of longer-term earnings growth from a global perspective. Such asset 
managers are consequently highly skilled even at investing solely in Japanese stocks. Having a physical 
presence in Japan confers little if any advantage. CEOs of over 200 Japanese companies now visit 
London and/or New York every quarter to meet with investors. Many overseas investors have more 
opportunities to meet with top Japanese executives in their home countries than in Tokyo, where their 
access is typically limited to the director in charge of investor relations. One reason that top Japanese 
executives cater to overseas investors is that foreigners’ shareholdings in Japanese companies have 
grown. Another, perhaps even more important, reason is that the executives can obtain valuable 
information by talking with overseas investors. For example, a certain Japanese CEO said that of the 
investors he has met that are able to deeply discuss his company's long-term value, including capital 
structure optimization, 80% are foreign and 20% are Japanese. He went on to say that Japanese 
investors never share opinions that are helpful in managing his company, so he now talks about business 
strategy and other such matters with overseas investors only. Overseas asset managers invest in not only 
Japanese companies but many foreign companies that Japanese CEOs view as competitors. They thus 
share the same vantage point as Japanese CEOs and often have valuable insights regarding business 
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strategy. For long-term investors, another advantage of not being present in Japan is freedom from 
distraction by information that is merely short-term noise. With quantitative investment strategies now 
executable from anywhere in terms of both analysis and trading, being located in Japan no longer offers 
any particular advantage. 
xix The GPIF has now designated several asset managers as reserve managers in the event of early 
redemption of assets managed by an existing manager. However, the GPIF has at times unexpectedly 
experienced more such early redemptions than the number of reserve managers it had on standby. 
xx Its transition managers for Japanese equities are Nomura Securities and BlackRock. 
xxi For more details, see Nomura (2007). 
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Balance between benefits & contributions
Plan sponsor wants to minimize its 
contributions but plan participants & 
pensioners want it to increase benefits
Balance between short- & 
long-term horizons
Balance between fund’s 
returns & asset 
managers’ revenues
Asset managers’ pursuit of AUM growth 
may detract from pension fund’s returns
Balance between 
fund’s returns & 
commissions
Growth in brokers’ commission 
revenues invariably reduces pension 
fund’s returns
• What investment risk/return levels are 
appropriate?
• High investment returns are required 
to reduce contributions but investment 

















• Plan participants are 
more sensitive to 
sponsor’s credit risk
• Plan participants have 
stronger incentive to 
take investment risks
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Figure 2: OECD Guidelines for Pension Fund Governance
Governance structure Governance mechanisms
Overview
Guidelines’ topics: ① identification of responsibilities, ②
governing body, ③ accountability,④ suitability, ⑤ delegation 
and expert advice, ⑥ auditor, ⑦ actuary and ⑧ custody
Guidelines’ topics: ⑨ risk-based internal controls, ⑩
reporting and ⑪ disclosure
Crux
A best-practice governance structure is risk-based, clearly 
separates operational and oversight responsibilities, ensures 
accountability and suitability of those charged with said 
responsibilities, delegates authority as warranted and 
assesses delegation outcomes.
Pension funds should have adequate internal 
controls, reporting and disclosure to ensure 
appropriate and timely decision-making by 




 Pension funds should have clear framework for sharing 
operational and oversight responsibilities; internal 
governance structure and management objectives should 
be documented if not statutorily codified.
 All pension funds should establish a governing body 
responsible for their operation.
 The governing body is accountable to pension plan 
participants and bears legal responsibility commensurate 
with its authority.
 The governing body should possess minimum qualifications 
to ensure expertise required for pension fund operations 
and may delegate authority to subcommittees or staff.
 The governing body should periodically subject fund 
operations to external scrutiny by at least auditor and 
actuary.
 Internal controls are necessary to ensure that 
personnel with operational or oversight 
responsibilities fulfill their roles.
 Internal controls should include performance 
assessments, compensation mechanisms, 
information systems and risk management 
procedures. The governing body should 
prescribe a code of conduct and conflict-of-
interest policy to ensure independence and 
impartiality of personnel with operational or 
oversight responsibilities.
 Pension funds should appropriately report and 
otherwise disclose information to pension plan 
participants and regulatory authorities.
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Source: NRI, based on OECD Guidelines
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 3: Recommended principles and policies for PRFs
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Organizational design & governance















⑦ Code of conduct
⑧ Risk management
⑨ Force majeure rules
Source: Clark & Monk (2011)
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 Approves engagement of investment managers
 Meets with executive officers and staff to discuss investment policies' 
effectiveness and achievement of investment objectives
 Monitors compliance with investment policies, standards and procedures; 
oversees implementation of appropriate procedures to verify agents’ 
compliance with CPPIB Act and investment policies
 Reviews, evaluates and approves investment procedures
Required to meet at least four times 
annually (met six times in FY2015).  
Staffed by full Board of Directors. 
Audit Committee
 Confirms implementation and maintenance of appropriate internal audit 
procedures with executive officers
 Reviews, evaluates and approves internal audit procedures
 Evaluates and approves annual financial statements
 Meets with external auditor regarding annual financial statements and 
auditor’s reports
 Evaluates all investments and trades that detract from returns
 Meets with chief internal auditor and executive officers to assess internal 
audit procedures’ effectiveness
Required to meet at least four times 
annually (met five times in FY2015).  
Staffed by nine Board members 
(required to have at least three as 
members). Internal and/or external 






 Reviews and recommends CEO and other officers’ compensation levels
 Develops and oversees CEO/officer performance evaluation processes
 Reviews and recommends compensation policies, plans and practices; 
recommends and approves benchmarks applicable to incentive-based 
compensation
 Annually reviews CEO’s officer succession plans and reviews and 
recommends officer appointments
 Oversees disclosure of directors and officers’ compensation in annual
reports
 Oversees employees’ benefits and pension plans
Required to meet at least five times 
annually (met six times in FY2015).  
Staffed by seven Board members 




 Reviews actual state of CPPIB’s governance
 Evaluates Board’s effectiveness through reviews of Board evaluations, 
succession plans, new director selection criteria and new directors’ 
qualifications  and ongoing director appointment planning
 Monitors Governance Manual, Code of Conduct and conflict-of-interest 
management policies’ content/application and approves revisions thereof
 Approves proxy voting principles and guidelines
Required to meet at least four times 
annually (met six times in FY2015).  
Staffed by seven Board members 
(including Board Chairperson; 
required to have at least three 
members).
3
Source: NRI, based on CPPIB disclosure documents
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1. Oz: Australia; NZ: New Zealand
2. NE: Northern Europe
3. n = number of funds
4. Units: ¥10,000, converted at 2010 year-end exchange rates
Source: Keith Ambachtsheer, “How Pension Funds Actually Pay Their People,” May 2011,  Rotman International Centre for 
Pension Management
Oz/NZ1 US NE2/UK Canada
Maximum
15,259 8,636 5,947 22,144
75th%tile 5,002 3,707 3,878 15,846
Median
4,139 3,503 3,381 5,263
25th%tile 3,169 2,558 2,990 3,357
Minimum
2,379 1,540 1,442 2,354
Average
5,255 3,797 3,454 9,247
n =
9 10 8 10
Figure 5: Global pension fund staff compensation 
by region  (5 highest-paid staff per fund)
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved. 5




Tightening of pension actuarial
standards
(e.g., fair valuation of liabilities)




Shift from asset classes to
sources of return
Shift to asset management 
in context of liabilities (LDI)
Pension fund
investment reforms





(assets net of liabilities)































(1) Traditional approach: set (manage) asset allocations (risk contributions are observed  
on ex-post basis)
(2) Risk budgeting: set (manage) risk contributions first (asset allocations are determined as 





Figure 7: Risk budgeting vs. traditional asset allocation
Source: NRI
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
①Strategy minimizes variability 
of pension fund surplus 
(assets - liabilities)
②Expected returns are typically 
lower than liabilities’  
discount rate
→Shortfall would lead to certain 
increase in contribution rate
③Quantify size of contribution 
rate increase that would be 
required if this strategy were 
adopted
①Adopt high expected-return 
strategy to avert certain 
contribution rate increase
②Quantify extent to which 
adoption of this strategy 
would mitigate contribution 
rate increase on average and 
size of worst-case 
contribution rate increase 
Pension assets = risk minimization strategy + growth strategy
7
Figure 8: OTPP’s barbell portfolios (example)
Source: NRI
Pension assets = risk minimization strategy + λ(growth strategy)
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 9: Comparison of major pension funds’ risk class definitions
Fund Risk classes Asset classes






ATP Equities Rates Inflation Commodities Credit 13










CalPERS Growth Income Real assets Inflation Liquidity 17
OTPP Equities Debt Real assets Liability hedges Commodities 9
APF Company exposure Rates Real assets
Special 
opportunities Cash 9
Towers Watson Equities Term Illiquidity Inflation Currency Credit Skill Insurance 8
Source: NRI, based on above funds’ annual reports
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Figure 10: ATP’s asset and risk allocations by risk class







ES at 1% level*
(3mo)
Total portfolio 254.7 100％ 100％
Interest rates
Investments in bonds with interest rate risk













Investments in broad universe of equities








・Inflation-linked bonds: 0.7; inflation-linked other: 5.5
・Real estate: 34.6







・Commodity futures (oil-linked bonds): 4.4





*Note: ES at 1% level is each risk class’s expected shortfall over a 3mo timeframe at the 1% level (i.e., worst-percentile of risk class’s 3mo 
return distribution). For example, in the event of worst-percentile 3mo returns in the interest rate class, ATP would incur a roughly 
DKK400 million drawdown on its holdings of bonds with interest rate risk.
Source: ATP’s Annual Report 2015
9
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Figure 11: ATP’s risk factor framework
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Source: ATP’s Annual Report 2015
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.






(Capitalizing on status as long-term 
investor)
Public market beta (reference 
portfolio)
Various active programs
Real estate, infrastructure, etc.
Benchmarks constructed differently than 
public market benchmarks (e.g., smart beta)
Traditional public market benchmarks







Figure 12: CPPIB’s sources of return
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 13: Overview of GPIF
12
Investment objectives Basic investment policy
 Japan’s public pension system (Employees’ Pension and 
National Pension programs) operates based on the principle 
of intergenerational support, not 100% prefunding of 
benefits. In other words, retirees’ benefits are largely funded 
by pension insurance premiums paid by current labor force. 
However, with Japan’s population rapidly aging, if pension 
benefits were funded solely by current labor force’s premium 
contributions, a sharp increase in the contribution rate or 
drastic reduction in benefits would be unavoidable. The 
public pension system therefore holds reserves, the 
investment returns on which are used to partially fund 
benefits under the government’s pension funding plan.
 The GPIF’s role is to contribute to the stable operation of the 
Employees’ Pension Insurance and National Pension 
programs by managing and investing pension reserves 
entrusted to it by the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare 
and remitting its investment returns to the government’s 
Pension Special Account.
 Over the 10 years from its FY2006 inception through 
FY2015, the GPIF earned a compound annual return of 
2.85% in real terms (nominal rate of return - nominal wage 
inflation rate), outperforming the MHLW’s assumed rate of 
return. Its investment performance has improved Japan’s 
public pension finances.
 The GPIF is keenly aware that the pension reserves it manages 
represent a portion of the pension insurance premiums collected 
from pension plan participants and are a precious source of 
funding for future benefits. It has formulated specific policies for 
managing and investing pension reserves in the aim of long 
contributing to public pension programs’ stable operation by 
safely and efficiently investing from a long-term perspective 
solely in the interests of pension plan participants.
 Additionally, the GPIF manages and invests pension assets in 
accord with the Specific Guidelines for Safe and Efficient Long-
Term Management and Investment of Pension Assets in effect 
since October 1, 2015.
Source: NRI, based on GPIF disclosure documents
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 14: Comparison of GPIF’s old and new policy asset mixes






allocation 60% 12% 11% 12% 5%
Old permissible 
deviation ±8% ±6% ±5% ±5% -
New target 
allocation 35%(39%) 25%(23%) 15%(14%) 25%(23%) (1%)
New permissible 
deviation ±10% ±9% ±4% ±8%
Source: GPIF
(as of Mar 31, 2016)
10
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Figure 15: Economic scenarios used to estimate expected returns
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2012 2023 2024 (Fiscal year)
Cabinet Office projection horizon Long-term averages (size of downshift in 








Reference Scenario Inflation, wage growth and investment 
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Figure 16: Expected returns by asset class
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ME Scenario -0.2% 3.2% 0.9% 3.6% -1.7%
MBC Scenario -0.1% 3.1% 1.4% 4.1% -1.1%
Expected returns (nominal: real return + nominal wage inflation rate) Wage inflation rate
ME Scenario 2.6% 6.0% 3.7% 6.4% 1.1% 2.8%
MBC Scenario 2.0% 5.2% 3.5% 6.2% 1.0% 2.1%
Note: ME Scenario: Middling Economic Scenario; MBC Scenario: Market Base-case Scenario
Source: NRI, based on GPIF data
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.













ME Scenario 1.77% 4.57% 12.8% 44.4% 9.45% 11.2%
MBC Scenario 1.98% 4.08% 12.8% 43.8% 9.38% 11.2%
Reference: Corresponding values for 100% domestic bond portfolio
ME Scenario -0.20% 2.60% 4.7% 51.7% 3.86% 3.52%
MBC Scenario -0.10% 2.00% 4.7% 50.0% 3.83% 3.48%
1. Shortfall probability: Probability of portfolio's nominal return falling short of wage inflation rate
2. Conditional ES-1: Expected shortfall when portfolio's nominal return falls short of wage inflation rate, assuming normally distributed returns
3. Conditional ES-2: Expected shortfall when portfolio's nominal return falls short of wage inflation rate, assuming empirically distributed 
returns (based on actual returns over previous 20 years)
4. ME Scenario: Middling Economic Scenario; MBC Scenario: Market Base-case Scenario
Source: NRI, based on GPIF data
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 18: Projections of pension reserves’ growth path (in real terms) with new policy asset mix
17
Source: GPIF
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.

















Hiring of purely active 
managers
Revised external manager 
evaluation criteria
Adopted Japan’s Stewardship 
Code
Adopted smart beta indexes
Adopted JPX-Nikkei 400Benchmark diversification
Signed UNPRI
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 20: Annualized excess returns over benchmark and annual win-loss record 
by asset class over decade through March 2016
19
Note: Of total excess returns by asset class, the above excess returns are those attributable to individual asset factors, regarded as a 
proxy for asset managers’ excess returns.
Source: NRI, based on data in GPIF’s Annual Report Fiscal Year 2015
Asset class 10-yr excess return W-L record
Domestic bonds -0.00% 4W-6L
Domestic equities -0.00% 5W-5L
Foreign bonds -0.00% 5W-5L
Foreign equities -0.01% 5W-5L
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Figure 21: Disaggregation of excess return over asset-class benchmark
Asset-class 
benchmark return (A)
Total manager-benchmark return (B)
Difference between A and B
Excess return over manager
benchmark (C)
＜
Source: NRI, based on GPIF disclosure documents
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 22: Proposed use of derivatives by GPIF
1. The GPIF may trade derivatives such as bond options and currency futures/options only to hedge 
the risk of investment losses.
2. In addition to derivative trades authorized by Cabinet orders for pension reserve investment 
purposes (limited to trades to hedge the risk of securities investment losses), the GPIF may also 
trade exchange-traded currency futures.
Source: Excerpted from MHLW document
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 23: GPIF’s Investment Principles
1. Our overarching goal should be to achieve the investment returns required for the public pension system with 
minimal risks, solely for the benefit of pension recipients from a long-term perspective, thereby contributing to the 
stability of the system.
2. Our primary investment strategy should be diversification by asset class, region, and timeframe. While 
acknowledging fluctuations of market prices in the short term, we shall achieve investment returns in a more 
stable and efficient manner by taking full advantage of our long-term investment horizon. At the same time we 
shall secure sufficient liquidity to pay pension benefits.
3. We formulate the policy asset mix and manage and control risks at the levels of the overall asset portfolio, each 
asset class, and each investment manager. We employ both passive and active investments to attain benchmark 
returns (i.e., average market returns) set for each asset class, while seeking untapped profitable investment 
opportunities.
4. By fulfilling our stewardship responsibilities, we shall continue to maximize medium- to long-term equity 
investment returns for the benefit of pension recipients.
Source: GPIF’s website
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 23: GPIF’s Investment Principles: Explanation of Principle 1
(Principle 1)”Our overarching goal should be to achieve the investment returns required for the public pension system 
with minimal risks, solely for the benefit of pension recipients from a long-term perspective, thereby contributing to the 
stability of the system”
 Japan’s public pension system (Employees’ Pension Insurance and National Pension) is fundamentally 
managed as a pay-as-you-go system that incorporates the concept of intergenerational dependency, whereby 
contributions paid by working generations support older generations.
 In the light of a declining birthrate and an aging population, funding pension benefits solely with contributions 
from working generations would impose upon them an unduly excessive burden, so fiscal plan has been drawn 
up to use the reserve assets (GPIF) to fund benefits and achieve fiscal equilibrium within about 100 years.  
After the fiscal balancing period, the fund is projected to hold reserve assets equivalent to one year of benefits, 
and is to be used for the benefit of later generations.
 The GPIF’s mission is to contribute to the stability of the pension system by achieving the investment returns 
required for the aforementioned pension system.  In other words, the most significant risk to the GPIF is a 
failure to achieve such returns
 We shall not pursue higher returns for their own sake. Our persistent goal is to secure the necessary returns 
required for the pension system from a long-term perspective.  The GPIF assigns the highest priority to the 
benefits of pension recipients and makes investments upon taking into consideration the size of the market in 
which we invest, while maintaining the value of reserve assets.  We shall never use reserve assets to influence 
equity markets or to implement economic policies.  We are committed to making investments solely for the 
benefit of pension ricipients.
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 24: GPIF’s Code of Conduct
1. Social responsibility
 The GPIF’s mission is to contribute to the stability of the public pension system (Employees’ Pension Insurance and National Pensions) by managing the reserve assets and 
distributing the proceeds to the government.
2. Fiduciary duty
 We fully understand that the reserve assets are instrumental for future pension benefits payments, act solely for the benefit of pension recipients, and pledge to pay due 
attention as prudent experts in exercising our fiduciary responsibilities. The Committee members of the Investment Advisory Committee shall by no means be motivated by 
benefitting the organizations to which they belong.
3. Compliance with laws and maintaining highest professional ethics and integrity
 We shall comply with laws and social norms, remain fully cognizant of our social responsibilities associated with pension reserve management, and act with the highest 
professional ethics and integrity to avoid any distrust or suspicion of the public.
4. Duty of confidentiality and protecting the GPIF’s asset
 We shall strictly control confidential information that we come to access through our businesses, such as non-public information related to investment policies and 
investment activities, and never use such information privately or illegally.
 We shall effectively use the GPIF’s assets, both tangible and intangible (e.g., documents, proprietary information, system, and know-how), and protect and manage such 
assets properly.
5. Prohibition of pursuing interests other than those of GPIF
 We shall never use our occupations or positions for the interests of ourselves, relatives, or third parties.
 We shall never seek undue profits at the expense of the GPIF.
6. Fairness of business transactions
 We shall respect fair business practices at home and abroad, and treat all counterparties impartially.
 We shall never make transactions with anti-social forces or bodies.
7. Improving information disclosure
 We shall continue to improve our public information disclosure and public relations activities.
 We shall ensure the accuracy and appropriateness of our financial statements and other public documents that are required to be disclosed by laws and ordinances.
 We shall remain mindful that our outside activities, regardless of whether business or private (e.g., publications, speeches, interviews, or use of social media) affect the 
credibility of the GPIF, and act accordingly.
8. Developing human resources and respect in the workplace
 We are committed to the GPIF’s mission by improving our professional skills and expertise, promoting communication and teamwork and nurturing a diversity of talents and 
capabilities.
 We shall respect each person’s personality, talents and capabilities, perspectives, well-being, and privacy to maintain a good work environment, and never allow 
discrimination or harassment.
9. Self-surveillance of illegal or inappropriate activity
 Whenever an illegal or inappropriate activity is (or is expected to be) perpetrated by Committee members, executives, staff, or other related personnel, such activity shall be 
immediately reported to the GPIF through various channels including our whistleblowing system.
 When such a report is made, we shall conduct the necessary investigation and take corrective actions and preventive measures according to our internal rules.
Source: GPIF’s website
Copyright(c) 2016 Nomura Research Institute、 Ltd. All rights reserved.
Figure 25: Proposed reforms of GPIF’s governance structure (transfer of decision-
making authority from president to Management Committee)
25Source: MHLW
New Council








Audit Reports Audit  
Management Board
・Consist of President and Experts in Finance, 
Economy ,Investment and Business Management (9) 
・Attendance of CIO possible if  necessary 
Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare
Instruction of  Medium-Term Objectives(inc.Target Return )
Approval of Medium-Term Plan (inc.Policy Asset  Mix)
Performance Evaluation  
Execution
Determination of Policy Asset Mix and 
other important policies 
Audit Committee





















Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare
Design of Public Pension Schemes
Actuarial Valuation of Public Pension Schemes 
Instruction of  Medium-Term Objectives(inc.Target Return)
Approval of Medium-Term Plan (inc.Policy Asset  Mix)
Performance Evaluation  
Deliberation and Approval of 
Policy Asset Mix and other important policies 
Investment Advisory Committee
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